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CURRENT LEGISLATION
THE ASSUMPTION OF A MORTGAGE BY GRANTEE OF ENCUMBERED
PREMISEs.-Prior to the passage of Chapter 502, Laws of 1938, a
purchaser of land could assume a mortgage debt to which it was sub-
ject by any contract or agreement which so manifested his assent. No
particular form of words, other than a clear expression of intent, were
necessary. The insertion of a clause, with this expression of intent,
in the deed would be sufficient 1 or it could be present in a separate
instrument, which instrument required no formalities in execution.2
It has been held that such an agreement clear and convincing is not
within the Statute of Frauds and therefore may be oral.3 An addi-
tional way in which a grantee may have assumed a mortgage other
than by a recital in a deed and its subsequent acceptance or by separate
writing is by implied agreement. Thus, from facts and circumstances
accompanying a transaction, the court may imply an agreement to
assume a mortgage. An agreement between grantor and grantee to
the effect that payment of the mortgage debt shall constitute part of
the purchase price will guide the court in implying an assumption of
the mortgage debt by the purchaser.4 In jurisdictions outside of New
York purchasers have been held to have assumed the mortgage where
the amount of the mortgage debt was deducted and retained by the
purchaser out of the agreed price.5 In New York the mere deduction
of the amount of the mortgage by the purchaser was held not to be
conclusive evidence of intention to assume the encumbrance since such
conduct may be explained away otherwise. The deduction may be
for protection against a questionable encumbrance, yet it is of value
as some evidence of assumption.0
Chapter 502 no longer makes it possible for a grantee to assume
a mortgage orally, or by implication or even by separate instrument
unless certain formalities accompany the instrument. Under the pres-
ent status of the law, a grantee will not be held to have assumed a
mortgage unless "such grantee shall simultaneously with the convey-
'Campbell v. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26 (1876); Bowen v. Beck, 94 N. Y. 86(1883) ; Schley v. Fryer, 100 N. Y. 71, 2 N. E. 280 (1885) ; Kress v. Central
Trust Co. of Rochester, 246 App. Div. 76, 283 N. Y. Supp. 467 (4th Dept.
1935), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 629 (1935); Hardee v. Karmon, 149 Misc. 339, 266
N. Y. Supp. 601 (1932).
Watkins v. Vrooman, 51 Hun 175, 5 N. Y. Supp. 172 (4th Dept. 1889);
Howard v. Robbins, 67 App. Div. 245, 73 N. Y. Supp. 172 (4th Dept. 1901).
3 Taintor v. Hemmingway, 18 Hun 458 (N. Y. 1879); Vilas v. McBride,
62 Hun 324, 17 N. Y. Supp. 171 (3d Dept. 1891); Peet v. Kent, 5 N. Y. St.
Rep. 134 (1886); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Aitken, 125 N. Y. 660, 26 N. E. 73
(1891).
' Dorr v. Peters, 3 Edw. Ch. 132 (N. Y. 1837) ; Halsey v. Reed, 9 Paige
446 (N. Y. 1842) ; Ferris v. Crawford, 2 Denio 595 (N. Y. 1845) ; Douglass
v. Cross, 56 How. Pr. 330 (N. Y. 1878).
'Townsend v. Ward, 27 Conn. 610 (1858); Jogel v. Vollinger, 174 Mass.
521, 55 N. E. 458 (1899); Wenaus v. Wilkie, 41 Mich. 264, 1 N. W. 1049
(1879) ; Kostenbader v. Spotts, 80 Pa. 430 (1876).
'Ferris v. Crawford, 2 Denio 595 (N. Y. 1845) ; Belmont v. Corman, 22
N. Y. 438 (1860); Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354 (1884); Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Bostwick, 100 N. Y. 628, 3 N. E. 296 (1885).
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ance to him of such real property execute and acknowledge before an
officei authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds, a statement in
writing stating in substance that such grantee assumes and agrees to
pay such mortgage debt and giving the specific amount of the debt
assunled. The execution and the acknowledgment by a grantee of the
deed of conveyance to him containing such written statement shall be
sufficient compliance with the provisions of this chapter." 7 Thus two
methods are left open to a grantee who is about to assume and unless
one of these are followed, there can be no assumption. The grantee
must sign a written statement in substance stating that he assumes and
agrees to pay such mortgage debt, giving the specific amount of the
debt assumed. The statement must be acknowledged by an officer
authorized to take acknowledgments of deed, and its execution and
acknowledgment shall be simultaneous with the conveyance of the real
property. The only other way to assume would be by the execution
and acknowledgment by the grantee, of the deed of conveyance to him
containing such written statements.
The Statute should not be interpreted as causing any change in
the substantive law of assumption of mortgages. For example, a
grantee who follows the prescribed formalities of the Statute will
still not be held to have assumed if the grantee were not personally
liable."
The abuses and confusion which prevailed under the old law are
practically self-evident. Doubts and uncertainties remained with the
court in their attempt to find whether one had assumed a mortgage
or merely taken subject to the encumbrance. This is understandable
since the courts relied chiefly for their decisions on separate informal
instruments or drew their implications from facts and circumstances
accompanying the transaction. Remedial legislation was long awaited.
Chapter 502 aims to remove the confusion and the doubt which has
accompanied the assumption of mortgage cases. Hereafter, a com-
pliance with the formalities will give ample warning to the grantee of
the obligation which he is undertaking.
PHILIP M. LORBER.
'Laws of 1938, c. 502.
'Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74 (1854); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y.
280 (1877) ; Carrier v. United Paper Co., 73 Hun 289, 26 N. Y. Supp. 414 (4th
Dept. 1893); King v. Sullivan, 31 App. Div. 550, 52 N. Y. Supp. 130 (2d
Dept. 1898) ; Williams v. Van Gerson, 76 App. Div. 592, 79 N. Y. Supp. 95
(4th Dept. 1902); Jenkins v. Bishop, 136 App. Div. 104, 120 N. Y. Supp. 825
(3d Dept. 1909); Genesee Valley Nat. Bk. etc. v. Bolton etc., 248 App. Div.
530, 290 N. Y. Supp. 913 (4th Dept. 1936) ; Ross v. Davis etc., 138 Misc. 864,
248 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Allen, 147 Misc. 888, 264
N. Y. Supp. 732 (1933).
